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Critical scholars on finance – especially those who contribute to the 
interdisciplinary debate on financialization – have advanced fascinating 
insights into the complex world of derivatives. 1  In so doing, they have 
questioned orthodox perspectives on derivatives according to which these 
instruments reflect the true essence of modern finance in its pursuit of market 
efficiency (Greenspan 2002). In contrast, critical researchers have shown how 
derivatives are inherently linked to capitalist exploitation and unstable financial 
cultures. The debate has taken two directions. On the one hand, some studies 
have explored how derivatives affect the present-day financialized capitalism. 
For instance, Bryan and Rafferty (2006) argue that derivatives represent a 
third degree of separation in the ownership of capital after the joint-stock form. 
If we take the case of a stock option, this instrument entitles the holder only to 
the price change in the underlying shares but not to the actual shares. This 
implies that derivatives holders become less concerned with events occurring 
in the field of production. Building on such argument, Wigan (2009) has 
shown that derivatives are like artifices of indifference because they make 
financialization disengage from the ‘real’ productive economy. On the other 
hand, scholars in the social studies of finance (SSF) field have uncovered the 
socio-cultural embeddedness of derivatives markets, agents and devices. For 
example, in a remarkable study, MacKenzie and Millo (2003) have captured 
the performativity of the Black-Scholes-Merton formula for pricing options 
through an ethnographic study of the Chicago Board Options Exchange. They 
have shown that the empirical success of this theory was due to the fact that 
traders used it in their activities on the pits. In short, options theory shaped the 
market in a performative manner. 
 
Thus, critical scholars have proposed alternative views on derivatives that 
innovatively challenge the assumption that these contracts can produce a 
complete market in the sense given by Arrow and Debreu (1954). 2 This is 
 2 
certainly a laudable achievement. However, despite their original insights, 
critical studies fall short of providing the appropriate analytical tools to explore 
the specificities of derivatives excesses in distinct contexts such as the Italian 
political economy. This is the case for two main reasons. First, analyses that 
contextualize derivatives within the abstract contours of modern capitalism are 
geared towards explaining how these instruments expand the frontiers of 
global capital accumulation. Yet, they focus too much on the abstract features 
of finance-dominated growth and ultimately ignore what Nölke, Heires, and 
Bieling (2013) define as the politics of financialization, namely: the actual 
actors and power struggles constructing financial developments on the 
ground. Thus this literature glosses over how the global expansion of 
derivatives – or, more generally, financialization – essentially depends on the 
distinct conflicts in which key social forces are involved. Second, the politics of 
financial innovation could be addressed through the heuristic framework of 
SSF. After all, scholars in this specialism seek to show how financial markets 
and models – far from being efficient and objective – are inherently driven by 
changing socio-cultural norms and conventions. Hence, at a first glance, this 
perspective could provide a useful understanding of financial agents and their 
pragmatic initiatives. However, SSF conflate actors and technologies within 
small-scale networks, often relying on the notion of performativity to explain 
how markets – together with the subjects involved – are produced through 
discursive reiteration. Consequently, this approach fails to appreciate the 
wider political-economic environment in which actors are situated and how 
key social forces might deploy derivatives for strategic purposes. 
 
Against the shortcomings of the critical literature on derivatives, this chapter 
focuses particularly on the cultural-performative perspective and argues that 
the latter exemplifies a ‘cultural turn’ in political economy that does not 
account for the tactical scenario constraining – or enabling – the realisation of 
any given performance (Sum and Jessop 2013). Pushed to its logical 
conclusion – a path which, as we will see, Foucauldian-inspired studies have 
taken (Aitken 2007; de Goede 2005; Langley 2009) – performativity implies 
that differences amongst agents are mostly irrelevant since it is through their 
combined action that financialized norms are performed and reproduced. The 
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paradox is that, although the role of agency is recognized, the latter 
nonetheless lacks differential political-economic and socio-cultural leverage. 
In such analytical context, it is difficult to capture ‘who’, ‘how’ and ‘why’ adopts 
financialized practices – such as derivatives –differentially and tactically. 
 
Premised on this critique, my chapter re-introduces active agency to the 
analytical picture in order to uncover the power struggles underpinning the 
growth of derivatives in the Italian context. By drawing on insights from 
Political Marxism (Knafo 2002, 2010, 2013) and Critical Institutionalism 
(Konings 2008, 2010b, 2011), this work conceives social construction as a 
fluid phenomenon in which historical agents interact with each other through 
the mediation of continuously renegotiated practices. In this historicized 
framework, people are seen as exerting power by exploiting extant 
materialities and meanings in the attempt to enhance their positions over 
others. However, far from structurally reifying human reality, contested praxis 
opens up opportunities to further transform existing inter-subjective rules. 
 
Through these lenses, the study focuses on how Italian neoliberal-minded 
technocrats and centre-left politicians (henceforth neoliberal reformists) 
attempted to challenge the country’s old political and business elites over the 
course of the 1990s. 3  They did so by implementing a market-oriented 
modernization of Italian capitalism, a crucial component of which was the 
shareholder-oriented transformation of the country’s financial system – that is 
banking, securities markets and corporate governance (Cioffi and Hopner 
2006; Deeg 2005). The work focuses particularly on the ‘enabling’ (Konings 
2010b) character of these pro-market reforms and how they provided 
opportunities for the Agnellis – the founding family and historical blockholders 
of the car-manufacturer FIAT – to do exactly the opposite of what neoliberal 
reformists hoped for: to secure ownership over their business empire through 
the strategic use of equity swaps. 
 
The chapter proceeds in six steps. First, it advances a critique of cultural-
performative approaches in critical research on finance. Second, it comments 
briefly on derivatives as essential tools of tactical accounting deception. Third, 
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it explores the political-economic and socio-cultural context in which neoliberal 
reformists emerged and began to put forward the necessity to modernize the 
domestic financial system from the mid-1990s onwards. Fourth, it focuses on 
the specificities of the corporate governance reform. Fifth, it examines the 
FIAT case and how the Agnelli family avoided diluting their ownership and 
control by using equity swaps. Finally, the chapter concludes in support of 
undertaking a cultural turn in the financialization debate that elucidates the 
political-strategic environment in which financial innovation thrives. 
 
Underperforming cultures of finance 
 
Critical research on finance is currently experiencing a cultural revival. Rather 
than focusing on the material and quantitative reality – as in the case of 
Régulation School (Boyer 2000), Post-Keynesian economics (Stockhammer 
2008) and Marxist political economy (Lapavitsas 2009) – culture-oriented 
studies explore financial markets as domains constituted by conventional 
habits and discourses. In this regard, SSF scholars are doing much to 
uncover the construction of modern finance as experienced by practitioners in 
their daily activities (Beunza and Stark 2012; MacKenzie 2006; Preda 2009; 
Zaloom 2006). Far from depicting financial developments as abstract entities, 
they examine the microcosm of actors, technologies, no-nonsense practices 
and bricolage-like innovation producing such phenomena. For instance, 
Mackenzie and Millo (2003) deploy the notion of performativity to examine the 
extent to which options pricing theory was an empirical success not because it 
discovered pre-existing patterns, but because it performed – that is, moulded 
– markets in a way that increasingly fitted the model.4 
 
Expanding on this notion of performing discourses and practices, other 
culture-oriented scholars such as De Goede (2005), Langley (2009) and 
Aitken (2007) draw on Foucault (1977) and Butler (1997) to explore how 
actors collectively create the dominant discourse of modern finance by 
performing it – that is, carrying it out – in their daily habits. This is obviously a 
more dense and pervasive understanding of performativity that incorporates 
society at a macro-level rather than being confined within the small-scale 
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boundaries of trading floors, as it is the case with SSF. For instance, Langley 
(2009) examines how people choose to invest in the stock market as a 
rational form of saving compared to using more traditional accounts at thrift 
institutions. Hence, by becoming a normal and largely unquestioned 
ensemble of everyday practices, present-day finance – with its complex and 
highly marketized activities – turns into an overarching apparatus that spreads 
its disciplinary power deep inside subjective identities. Following a similar 
understanding of discursive production in everyday life, de Goede (2005) 
examines the events concerning the enactment of the 2000 Hedge Fund 
Disclosure Act in the US, following the collapse of the hedge fund Long Term 
Capital Management in 1998. She argues that this regulatory framework did 
not represent a ban on hedge funds, but a depoliticization and normalization 
of their operations. In other words, authorities created a legitimate discursive 
environment for hedge funds to operate. Furthermore, the philosophy behind 
– such as the assumptions of derivatives trading as an efficient risk-
management practice – represents the major contemporary discourse that 
legitimizes contemporary finance as a highly profitable business. 
 
Thus, as these studies show, cultural-performative approaches are on the 
rise. This is a much-needed development in critical scholarship on finance for 
at least two reasons. First, it shows the importance of focusing on human 
agency as the architect and interpreter of hegemonic discourses (Amoore et 
al. 2000:62–63). Second, it strongly asserts the significance of discursive 
phenomena in a field overly dominated by a materialist bent. However, as this 
chapter claims, such growing interest for the inter-subjective processes of 
meaning creation tends to obscure the strategic environment in which actors 
experience their existence. In fact, as Konings (2010b:63) notes, culture-
focused studies properly explore the semiotic constitution of subjectivities. 
Yet, what they fail to deploy is an understanding of discursive not only as 
shaping actors’ identities but also as enabling their action. In particular, the 
extensive use of performativity analysis has the unfortunate effect of flattening 
social relations by transferring power from historically specific forces to the 
general discursive space the features of which constrain everyone in similar 
ways. 5 As a result of this – when applied to the Italian case or elsewhere – 
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cultural-performative studies end up disregarding the fact that key actors do 
not merely adopt derivatives because the dominant financialized discourse 
condition them. On the contrary, they often do so to advance their objectives 
against other agents in a tactical manner. In other words, people aim at 
achieving context-specific aims by managing ever-present unintended events 
and by attempting to influence commonly shared norms. 
 
To rectify such limitations in cultural studies of finance, this chapter calls for a 
more historicized approach to financial innovation and – in our specific case – 
derivatives. It advances a critical method that aims at capturing the tactical 
and conflictual character of people’s discursive and material interaction. 6 
Significantly, this perspective does not conceptualize power as structured in 
and through the discourses of financialization. On the contrary, power is 
introduced at the level of agency once discursive structures are recast as 
mediating social relations amongst actors (Knafo 2010: 504). In other words, 
actors interact with each other by negotiating complex discourses and 
materialities, continuously exploiting – or more simply, relating to – these 
interconnecting architectures. This radically alters our understanding of 
power, which becomes the agential ability to construct discursive norms and 
gain leverage in a particular scenario. In other words, power is interpreted at a 
pragmatic level where some agents experiment with extant institutions whilst 
others abandon their search for empowering themselves and live reality 
according to existing norms. Yet, far from reifying human reality, the process 
of structuration is constantly open to conflictual relations and transformation. 
 
The following sections deploy this method to investigate first how Italian 
neoliberal-minded reformists attempted to challenge the country’s old political 
and business elites by implementing a market-oriented modernization of 
Italian capitalism and, in particular, a shareholder-oriented transformation of 
the country’s financial system. Next, the study focuses on the Agnelli family 
and their tactical use of derivatives. First, however, I reconsider derivatives as 
instruments of accounting dissimulation. 
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A brief excursus: financial derivatives as weapons of mass deception 
 
Derivatives-like contracts existed for a long time (Swan 1999). Yet, it is only in 
the late-nineteenth-century US that contracts on the future shipment of wheat 
were standardized into so-called futures and systematically disconnected from 
the final delivery of the underlying commodity. This innovation generated a 
surge in speculative activities that clashed with the interests of farmers and 
the rising populist movements (Geisst 2002: 4; Goodwyn 1976). At this point, 
facing agrarian forces, representatives of commodity exchanges recast 
derivatives trading and its speculative activities as essential resources for the 
management of business risk. In the end, this idea was institutionalized in 
such terms and the modern practices of derivatives-based risk management 
was eventually consolidated (Levy 2006). 
 
Still, as long as the majority of derivatives were traded on organized 
commodity exchanges, derivatives-based techniques did not reveal their full 
potential. It was only in the early 1970s – once American power relations were 
turning in favour of finance (Gowan 1999; Panitch and Gindin 2008) – that 
Chicago exchanges successfully lobbied for the introduction of financial 
derivatives on their trading pits (MacKenzie and Millo 2003; MacKenzie 2006). 
In this regard, the discipline of financial economics provided scientific 
legitimacy by describing derivatives as tools that protect investors from the 
risk of financial market volatility (Wigan 2009). 
 
During the 1970s, derivatives trading expanded but several regulatory 
uncertainties between the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
and the Security Exchange Commission (SEC) still remained (Markham 2002: 
88–89). Once these issues were solved in the early 1980s, derivatives grew in 
size and rate of innovation, becoming essential components of American 
financial power in the global economy (Konings 2006: 508–509). Three 
markets were particularly remarkable: index derivatives, asset-backed 
securities and, above all, swaps. According to the mainstream narrative, 
swaps emerged as useful instruments through which investors hedged their 
risk exposures to interest rates and exchange rates (Markham 2002: 192). 
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That was true to a certain extent. But, at a non-rhetorical level, swaps became 
also the perfect tools that companies, financial actors and governments can 
use to avoid regulation and to window-dress their books. As Partnoy 
(2009:46) explains in reference to the case of the historic investment bank 
Bankers Trust:  
 
Merton Miller’s insight implied that companies would do swaps not 
necessarily because swaps allocated risk more efficiently, but rather 
because they were unregulated. They could do swaps in the dark, 
without the powerful sunlight that securities regulation shined on other 
financial instruments. And here was the crucial point: to the extent 
companies and their financial officers could use custom-tailored swaps 
to avoid regulation or to hide risks, Bankers Trust’s profits from selling 
swaps to those companies might not disappear so quickly. Corporate 
treasurers hoping to benefit from such swaps would pay a premium – it 
wasn’t their money, after all – if the swaps were structured in a way 
that created more opportunity for profit, but hid the risks from their 
bosses. 
 
 Over the course of the 1980s, as derivatives trading expanded, other 
societies also began to adopt these very useful ‘weapons of mass deception’ 
(Dunbar 2006; Norris 2013). 7  How and why were they used in the Italian 
context? Let us look particularly at the case study of FIAT and equity swaps.8 
 
Modernizing Italian capitalism 
 
In the early 1930s, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means (1968: 8) famously 
described the most crucial development of American capitalism as ‘the 
dissolution of the old atom of ownership into its component parts, control and 
beneficial ownership’ They argued that the consolidation of the joint-stock 
company implied a separation of corporate ownership and control such that a 
myriad of dispersed owners – the shareholders – emerged. Whilst diversifying 
their investment portfolios across several firms listed on the stock exchange, 
these shareholders exerted almost no control over the managers who ran 
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day-to-day operations. The condition was such that the latter were potentially 
able to form a ‘technostructure’ through which they could consolidate their 
power over other social groups (Galbraith 2007). The research by Berle and 
Means became very influential and many studies focused on the various 
practices – such as independent boards of directors and the market for 
corporate control – that could make managers more accountable to 
shareholders (Grossman and Hart 1988; Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
 
Contrary to the American case but like other European countries, the Italian 
case was historically characterized by a relatively limited separation of 
ownership and control. In fact, Italy’s economic history evolved through an 
ownership liaison between private business oligarchies and the expanding 
public enterprise (Segreto 1998). So the Italian story was not one in which 
dispersed shareholders should develop mechanisms to make strong 
managers accountable (Roe 1994). Rather, the problem concerned instead 
the presence of strong blockholders – state and oligarchs – influencing the 
activities of weak managers against the interests of unprotected minority 
shareholders (Melis 2000: 354). 
  
Particularly from the late 1950s onwards, two intense forces – public and 
private capitalism – marked with their respective logics and points of friction 
the Italian political-economic arena. On the one hand, governing political 
parties – the alliance between Christian Democrats and Socialists – were 
concerned with controlling and driving the expansion of public enterprise as a 
way to guarantee their ‘self-reproduction’ (Bianchi 1987). In so doing, the 
dynamics of so-called Partitocrazia came into being, a condition in which the 
ruling parties eliminated any possibility for alternation in power and 
consolidated their clout over the state and society at large (Pasquino 1995). 
They politicized appointments in nearly every state-owned institution – from 
industry to banks, via schools, hospitals and post offices – through 
widespread networks of patronage and factional loyalty (Ginsborg 2001:139–
142). On the other hand, private business oligarchs necessitated of adequate 
solutions to protect their ownership structures against the expansion of the 
state-owned apparatus. As Barca (2001:44–46) shows, the architectures of 
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ownership in the private industry were so complex that they secured control 
even when the ownership quotas of blockholders decreased as a result of 
business expansion. Two mechanisms were indispensable for such condition 
to be achieved. The first one was the pyramidal group, in which two or more 
companies were legally separated but controlled by a holding through 
ownership chains. For instance, at the top of the pyramid sat the family-owned 
holding, whilst all the other companies had a mere subsidiary role. Of course, 
the voting rights of minority shareholders were dispersed over a large number 
of these subsidiary firms. The blockholders’ shares were instead concentrated 
in the holding at the top of the pyramid. Second, besides these pyramidal 
constructions, cross-shareholding alliances were cultivated to further secure a 
narrow separation of ownership and control. In addition to these two 
mechanisms, several other arti fices were adopted such as: including 
insurance companies as part of the pyramidal group in order to inject liquidity 
whenever it was needed; proxy votes with no obligations by the proxies to the 
principals; or the possibility for the management to refuse new shareholders 
as a protective measure against takeovers. Of course, the inefficient stock 
exchange and the absence of a transparent corporate governance regime 
completely sealed the power of blockholders over minority shareholders. 
 
It was the imperative to hold such high degrees of ownership concentration in 
the hands of few actors – whilst at the same time maintaining open channels 
for external funding and corporate growth – that encouraged blockholders to 
gather around several gravitational centres of Italian capitalism (Segreto 
1997: 649). Such meeting places were also crucial to cultivate the equilibria 
between private and state ownership. The most important hub was the Milan-
based investment bank Mediobanca that – due to the peculiar public-private 
nature of its shareholding syndicate – mediated the conflictual dynamics 
between the oligarchies and the expanding state-owned enterprises. Above 
all, Mediobanca became the financial engineer for large private companies by 
providing funding strategies that also guaranteed the oligarchic structures of 
ownership and control (Battilossi 1991; Segreto 2008). As authoritative 
journalists labelled it, Mediobanca was the so-called salotto buono of Italy: the 
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exclusive saloon where a clutch of business and political echelons managed 
tacitly the existing shareholding alliances (Economist 2010). 
 
This private-public liaison reached its most collusive and corrupt essence 
during the 1980s. It is at this point that a pro-market technocratic elite – based 
primarily at the Bank of Italy and the Ministry of Treasury (Deeg 2005: 528) – 
launched a critique of the Italian political economy that exalted the benefits of 
reducing public debt (Giavazzi and Spaventa 1988), privatizing the state-
owned sector (Goldstein 2003; Scognamiglio 1990) and, a few years later, 
modernizing the domestic financial system in favour of shareholder value 
(Amatori and Colli  2000; Associazione Disiano-Preite 1997; Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan 2000). Through their neoliberal critique of the Italian ‘mixed’ 
economy, technocrats aimed at undermining the foundations upholding 
conservative politics-cum-business affairs. To begin with, downsizing and 
privatizing the public enterprise implied hindering the normal reproduction of 
Partitocrazia that, as already mentioned, depended on the clientelistic 
exploitation of the state-owned apparatus. In addition, the objective of 
reducing public debt entailed removing government expenditure as an 
essential tool of mass consensus. In fact, especially during the Craxi 
administration (1983-1987), public spending was instrumental to creating an 
atmosphere of enrichissez-vous amongst large strata of privileged groups 
(Pasquino 2000: 79). 
 
Regarding instead private capitalist oligarchies, the shareholder-oriented 
transformation of the financial system implied an attack on their concentrated 
structure of ownership and control. Especially during the 1980s, companies 
had turned towards equity finance after comprehensive strategies of industrial 
and financial restructuring (Amatori and Colli 2000; Graziani 1998). However, 
the stock-market expansion did not signal concrete transformation in the 
traditional strategies of ownership concentration. Indeed, it was the result of 
the long-established practice of pyramid-building through which major groups 
increased the number of related spin-offs listed on the stock exchange (Deeg 
2005:528). Hence, more transparent rules of corporate governance, as well 
as an efficient and liquid equity markets, would have ensured equality of rights 
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amongst shareholders and less opportunities to weave cross-shareholding 
alliances. In a word, a growing call for meritocracy in corporate ownership and 
control endangered the traditional practices of private capitalism in Italy 
(McCann 2000:49–50). 
 
The neoliberal ideas put forward by technocrats became influential in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, when the process of European integration revealed a 
new impetus with the launch of the single market and the project of monetary 
union. In a context where the political-economic establishment and the 
popular discourse were supportive of Europe in a general sense (Quaglia 
2011), crucial reforms were introduced such as the removal of capital 
controls, the transformation of public banks into joint-stock companies and the 
independence of the central bank. 9  Above all, technocrats gained 
considerable power over the policy contents during the intergovernmental 
conference (IGC) on EMU. In February 1992, by adhering to the convergence 
criteria for joining EMU, they imposed an external discipline on the country’s 
vested interests and their reproductive capacities (Dyson and Featherstone 
1996). Of course, technocrats gradually advanced practices that disturbed the 
reproduction of the status quo in Italian capitalism. Yet, these tactics were 
insufficient to dismantle long-established power structures, both in their 
political and business dimension. In reality, it was only when the bribery 
scandals of Tangentopoli exploded in February 1992 that the traditional 
political system – with most part of its business connections – began to 
collapse. 10 From this moment onwards, technocrats together with the centre-
left coalition of the Olive Tree – who got to power in 1996 – captured the 
executive power and embarked on an extensive season of liberalizing reforms 
with the objective of joining EMU in 1999 (Cioffi and Hopner 2006; Deeg 
2005). In particular, they normalized labour relations in order to curb inflation 
and cut down government expenditure to stabilize public finance (Sbragia 
2001:81). Furthermore, they undertook a far-reaching privatization 
programme (Goldstein 2003) and – more importantly for our purposes – they 
attempted to transform Italian finance in line with the ideology of shareholder 
value. This was done in order to eradicate the oligarchic structure of Italian 
business. Let us now focus on the main traits of this financial modernization. 
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The shareholder-oriented transformation of Italian corporate governance 
 
The shareholder-oriented transformation of Italian finance entailed 
constructing a regime of corporate governance that favoured the dispersion of 
ownership as well as the development of a liquid and efficient stock market. In 
other words, this strategy was coherent with the objective of diluting the long-
lasting oligarchic nature of Italian business in the attempt to render it more 
reactive to global market inputs and innovation. As Massimo D’Alema – a 
leading figure of the centre-left – explained, ‘we still have not done enough to 
create a proper financial market [...] We do not have guarantees for small 
shareholders, no rules for public companies’ (Betts and Blitz 1997). 
 
As Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) show, the ideology of shareholder value 
originated in the historical evolution of American corporate capitalism, 
particularly once the latter fully unleashed the dynamics of financialization 
after the 1970s crisis. At its core stands a large and transparent stock market 
that functions as a source of business investment and corporate control for 
public companies. In a given company, dispersed and legally protected 
shareholders – primarily institutional investors – are the ultimate owners. 
These actors delegate to the board of directors the task of monitoring the 
managers who are in charge of directing the company’s day-to-day activities – 
e.g. investment, production, pricing, marketing and so on. In other words, 
managers are accountable to the board of directors and, ultimately, to the 
shareholders who have the voting power to select the board. The crucial point 
of this shareholder-oriented regime of corporate governance is the following: 
once the management fails to deliver profits and dividends, shareholders 
exercise their power at the general meeting and vote for a new board of 
directors and management. However, in reality, shareholders are too 
fragmented to exercise this control vis-à-vis the management and the passive 
board of directors. In this case, the market for corporate control enters the 
picture. Shareholders could show their dissatisfaction by selling the 
company’s shares and, in turn, depressing the share price accordingly. At this 
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point, the company turns into an attractive target for takeover strategies. 
Potential bidders buy up shares of the target company in order to take control 
of the board and replace the top management. In this sense, the market for 
corporate control disciplines the managers by pushing them to maximize 
shareholder value, otherwise they would succumb to hosti le takeovers (Clarke 
2007:130–131).  
 
Applied to Italy, this simple story concerning shareholder value promised a 
profound impact on the national business establishment. To be exact, as 
already seen, the historical rationale of Italian capitalism was rather different 
than the Anglo-American experience. In Italy, strong blockholders – such as 
the oligarchs and the state – influenced the activities of collusive managers 
against the interests of unprotected minority shareholders. Yet, as McCann 
(2000: 49–50) clearly explains: 
 
A properly functioning capital market with strong institutional investors 
would ensure a greater equality of rights between shareholders, thus 
undermining the capacity of [blockholders] to gain a dominant control of 
firms despite possessing only minority holdings. The marginalization of 
cross-shareholding alliances would greatly increase the feasibility of 
suc- cessful takeover bids and thus intensify the pressure on 
management to deliver higher profitability and larger dividends [...] This 
would serve to enhance economic efficiency and contribute to a 
growing meritocracy of ownership and control. 
 
Italian liberal intellectuals had for a long time advanced the importance of 
reforming Italian company law to prevent the formation of blockholders 
(Marchetti 2001). Yet, despite these influential opinions, it was particularly 
during the 1990s that the political-economic and cultural climate turned 
conducive to introducing the institutions and discourses of shareholder value. 
The major push to corporate governance reforms came from the process of 
privatization. Indeed, the 1994 privatization law was important in two 
respects. 11 First, by introducing norms that protected minority shareholders in 
the soon-to-be privatized companies, neoliberal reformists were free to 
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experiment without any particular resistance from the blockholders of existing 
private companies. Second, it created a contrast between privatized 
companies and other listed firms that did not conform with a transparent 
governance structure (Enriques 2009: 7). 
 
Concrete action towards a comprehensive reform of corporate governance 
was taken in 1996, when the Parliament delegated to the executive the power 
to transfer several EU directives into the Italian legislation. 12 Besides importing 
the European Capital Adequacy Directive and the Investment Services 
Directive, the Parliament gave the government also the task to consolidate 
financial market regulation into a single law.13 According to the provision, the 
government had to ‘amend the laws on listed corporations with specific regard 
to the board of internal auditors, minority shareholder rights, shareholder 
voting agreements and intra-group transactions, with a view to strengthen the 
protection of savings and minority shareholders’  (Enriques 2009: 9). Hence, in 
order to undertake this task, the Treasury established a technical committee 
under the leadership of Director-General Mario Draghi. This decision was 
controversial. In fact, influential voices complained that such an important 
reform was being implemented behind closed doors and away from a wider 
political debate (Scalfari 1997). Hence, an enquiry was opened at the lower 
house of the Parliament in October 1997 (Lonardi 1997). The ‘Draghi’ reform 
– as it was soon nicknamed – met the opposition of the centre-right and 
Confindustria, the major business association. In particular, the issue of 
mandatory takeover bids was the most controversial point (Puledda 1998a; 
Repubblica 1998; Scalfari 1998). However, in spite of such resistance, the 
reform was eventually passed in late February 1998 and came to be known 
as the consolidated law on finance (Testo Unico della Finanza, TUF).14 
 
TUF envisioned a new regime of corporate governance in favour of 
shareholder value. It was an ‘omnibus law that aggregated, reformulated and 
renewed virtually all civi l and criminal rules pertaining to capital markets, 
securities management, institutional investors, brokerage services, public 
offerings and rules for listed joint stock corporations’ (Deeg 2005:534). 
Amongst the key points, the following ones were particularly significant.15 
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First, the reform increased the protection of minority shareholders through a 
tighter regulation of shareholder agreements. The latter had to be notified 
publicly; they could not exceed three years; they were no longer valid in the 
case of takeover bids (Amatori  and Colli 2000:43). These measures hit the 
core of those cross-shareholding practices which blockholders traditionally 
used to consolidate their relations of mutual trust (McCann 2000:51–52). 
Furthermore, mandatory takeover bids became compulsory once exceeding 
30 per cent of the total capital (Puledda 1998b). Second, minority 
shareholders – identified according to a minimum ownership ranging from 1 to 
10 per cent of the outstanding shares – obtained more governance rights. 
Third, representation of minority shareholders was mandatory at the audit 
board, the internal body in charge of auditing activities. Finally, the reform 
reinforced the power of Commissione Nazionale per la Società e la Borsa 
(CONSOB), the national stock market authority. CONSOB was put in charge 
of supervising investor protection, the efficiency and transparency of the stock 
market, and the effective functioning of the market for corporate control. 
CONSOB could now request ad-hoc information and undertake on-site 
inspections concerning shareholder agreements and blockholding practices. 
 
Needless to say, the Draghi reform emphasized the importance of the stock 
market in a country where equity finance had traditionally played a marginal 
role. 16 In fact, whilst the Draghi committee was drafting the reform of corporate 
governance, the various national stock exchanges merged in the Milan-based 
Borsa which was then privatized and began to operate as Borsa Italiana in 
January 1998 (BorsaItaliana 1999). In a context where declining interest rates 
made government securities a less attractive form of investment for the wider 
public people looked at the stock market with enthusiasm (Betts 1997). In 
particular, the flotation of the recently privatized Telecom Italia mirrored the 
frenzy for the dot-com bubble in the United States (Rampini 1997).  
 
How to hedge the risk of ownership dilution: FIAT and equity swaps 
 
How far did corporate governance reforms transform Italian capitalism into a 
shareholder democracy? How did the oligarchies react to such a different 
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regulatory environment? It is now time to look at a unique case of market 
manipulation that shows how the new corporate governance regime did not 
simply constrain business oligarchies, but also enabled them to use the new 
institutions and discourses in a strategic sense. The following case concerns 
the car-manufacturer FIAT and its founding family: the Agnellis.17 
 
In a context of dramatic crisis, FIAT entered a three-year convertible bond of 
€3 billions with a consortium of eight banks in 2002. 18 As a hybrid of debt and 
equity, this instrument allowed the holder to convert the bond into the issuing 
company’s stocks – or cash of equal value – at an agreed-upon price. The 
FIAT’s convertible bond had a maturity date that was set for September 2005. 
More importantly, in the case of insolvency, the bond was to be converted into 
FIAT shares at a price of €10.3. This conversion implied dramatic 
consequences for the ownership structure of FIAT. In fact, the 30.6% 
ownership of the holding Ifi l Investments in FIAT – Ifil was controlled by IFI 
(62%), which was in turn entirely owned by the Agnelli family through the 
partnership Giovanni Agnelli & Co. S.a.p.az. – would have been diluted of 
roughly one third in favour of the banks. 
 
In fact, the worst happened. FIAT announced on April 26, 2005 – less than 
five months before maturity – that the convertible bond was going to be 
converted into shares. In other words, this was a historic event for Italian 
capitalism: the Agnelli empire was on the verge of collapse after a century of 
oligarchic control over FIAT. However, the family found an astute strategy to 
remain in the ‘driving seat’ (Economist 2005). The very same day when the 
bond conversion was announced, Exor Group – a Luxembourg-based 
financial holding which was controlled by the Agnelli family via IFI – entered 
into an equity swap contract with Merri ll Lynch International on €90 millions of 
FIAT ordinary shares. 19  An equity swap would normally be settled in cash. 
However, the contract between Exor Group and Merri ll Lynch included a 
clause that allowed also the physical settlement. Neither the investing public 
nor CONSOB were informed about this operation, except for a communiqué 
on August 24, 2005 in which Ifil and Giovanni Agnelli & Co. told CONSOB that 
no particular manoeuvre on FIAT shares was occurring. In this dispatch, Ifi l 
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and Giovanni Agnelli & Co. nonetheless stated that they intended to keep 
control of FIAT (Boffano and Griseri 2010). 
 
How does an equity swap specifically work? This is a derivative contract in 
which future cash flows are agreed to be exchanged between two 
counterparties – respectively known as the equity amount payer and the 
equity amount receiver – at specific interim dates or in a single maturity date 
in the future. The equity amount payer transfers to the equity amount receiver 
the positive difference between i) the spot value of the equity and ii) the initial 
reference price agreed on the contract. On the contrary, the equity amount 
receiver pays any potentially negative difference between these two elements. 
On top of this dimension which is typical of an equity future, the two parties 
enter into a further reciprocal obligation that is the swap element: the payer 
transfers to the receiver also the dividends generated by the equities in 
question, whilst receiving an interest rate (e.g. LIBOR or EURIBOR) on the 
notional capital equal to the value of equities at the moment of the agreement. 
 
In our case, the equity amount payer Merrill Lynch would have paid the equity 
amount receiver Exor Group the positive performance in relation to the initial 
reference price of the underlying equity plus the dividends. Merrill Lynch 
would have instead received from Exor Group the negative performance 
together with an interest rate on the notional capital – which is equal to the 
initial reference price multiplied by the number of underlying shares. After this 
agreement was signed, Merrill Lynch started to hedge by buying the 
underlying shares. In line with this hedging strategy, Merrill Lynch bought 
shares on the stock market from April to June 2005, accounting for the 15% of 
daily trading and 10% of FIAT’s voting capital. Accordingly, FIAT’s share price 
rose from €4.8 to €6. In accordance with the Italian regulation on takeovers, 
Merrill Lynch communicated that its ownership had reached the 2% threshold 
but never 5%. 20 How was it possible to hide the remaining share of FIAT’s 
voting capital that Merrill Lynch owned? 
 
The investment bank never exceeded the 5% level by ‘swapping out’  – that is, 
entering a reverse contract compared to the one with Exor Group – with two 
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other counterparts, ING bank and Cater Allen International, for a total of 6.5% 
of FIAT’s voting shares. Being in this case the equity amount receiver, Merrill 
Lynch entered these secondary equity swaps with ING and Cater Allen by 
transferring to the latter the underlying shares as credit risk collaterals. 21 
Hence, both banks also declared they went beyond the 2% threshold. In other 
words, this is all the market and CONSOB perceived during the period 
between April and September: three global investment banks merely 
exceeded the 2% threshold in FIAT’s ownership. 
 
In September 2005, when FIAT’s convertible bond finally expired, Merrill 
Lynch had already settled in cash the secondary equity swaps with ING and 
Cater Allen. At this point, the investment bank bought back the collaterals that 
were then transferred to Exor Group. Indeed, as already mentioned, the 
equity swap contained the clause of physical settlement. Eventually, Exor 
Group bilaterally sold these shares to Ifil, of which participation in FIAT’s 
ownership went simultaneously down to the 30% threshold – due to the 
convertible bond’s agreement – and up the same level as a result of the 
shares received by Merrill Lynch and its complex equity-swap strategy. 
 
At that time, few voices denounced the Agnelli’s abuse of the most basic rules 
of shareholder democracy (Bragantini 2005; Penati 2005). In fact, the 
authorities intervened very late and the case gained momentum only in the 
early 2007, when the Milan court began investigating the affair and CONSOB 
imposed sanctions on the top management of IFI and Ifil (Repubblica 2007). 
The main issue at stake concerned the communiqué that Ifil and Giovanni 
Agnelli & Co. released in late August 2005. Indeed, the latter did not disclose 
information about the equity swap between Exor Group and Merrill Lynch, 
therefore constituting an infringement of the current regulation on market 
communication and market manipulation. 22 In the end, the investigation was 
transferred to the court of Turin, the city where the Agnelli family is based. 
Here, the top management of IFI and Ifil was first acquitted in December 2010 
and eventually condemned in February 2013 (Boffano and Griseri 2010; 
Repubblica 2013). In the meantime, the case sparked a debate within 
CONSOB about how to prevent bidders from accumulating undisclosed equity 
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positions through cash-settled derivatives. These discussions led CONSOB to 
modify the rules of transparency concerning potential shareholdings with cash 
settlement. Investors are now obliged to communicate also their positions on 
cash-settled derivatives.23 
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has argued that cultural-performative studies on financialization 
do not take into account the strategic scenario constraining – or enabling – 
the realisation of any given agential performance (Sum and Jessop 2013). 
Paradoxically, although this approach could provide a prolific 
conceptualization of financial actors and their tactics, it is still unable to 
properly capture the power struggles underpinning the global expansion of 
derivatives and financialization more broadly – an aspect that brings cultural-
performative research closer to more abstract-structuralist views on 
derivatives (Bryan and Rafferty 2006; Wigan 2009). To rectify such limitations, 
the chapter has aimed at bringing agency back to uncover the conflictual 
relations shaping the use of derivatives in the Italian context. To do so, it has 
drawn on insights from Political Marxism (Knafo 2002, 2010, 2013) and 
Critical Institutionalism (Konings 2008, 2010b, 2011) with the objective of 
emphasizing how inter-subjective meanings not only influence actors’ 
identities but also enable them to act. 
 
By using this method, the study has examined the shareholder-oriented 
modernization of Italian finance as a strategy that neoliberal reformists 
implemented in order to challenge old political and business elites during the 
1990s (Cioffi and Hopner 2006; Deeg 2005). After this, the work has focused 
on how these pro-market reforms enabled the Agnelli family to secure 
ownership over FIAT through the tactical use of equity swaps. 
                                                  
Endnotes 
 
1  The financialization debate examines ‘the increasing role of financial 
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motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the 
operation of the domestic and international economies’ (Epstein 2005: 3). 
Useful introductions to the debate include special issues of: Economy & 
Society, 29 (1) 2000; Competition & Change, 12 (2) 2008 and 13 (2) 2009.  
2 According to this orthodox view, myriads of derivatives contracts – both plain 
vanilla and more complex synthetic combinations – enable all possible future 
states of the world to be captured by being traded on the basis of risk. For a 
critical examination of this thesis, see Wigan (2008, 2009). 
3  The terms ‘neoliberal-minded’, ‘neoliberal’ or ‘neoliberalism’ denote the 
ideology according to which ‘human well-being can best be advanced by 
liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional 
framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and 
free trade’ (Harvey 2005:2). Of course, the emphasis on the free market and 
the retreat of the state is a rhetorical matter. In reality, neoliberal forces 
capture state institutions and exploit them to secure their discipline over 
society (Konings 2010a). ‘Technocrat’ refers here to experts in specific fields – 
e.g. economics, law and so on – who apply their knowledge to government 
affairs either as technical advisers or unelected decision-makers (Silva 2008). 
4 Language philosopher John L. Austin (1962) initially developed the concept 
of performativity. He described as performative those ‘self-actualizing’ 
statements that do not simply state facts, but enact what they name in the first 
place (e.g., a promise). Callon (1998) later explored the performativity of 
economics and inspired SSF scholars to deal with such notion in their work. 
5 Compare Foucault (1977:176), who sees the latter as a ‘multiple, automatic 
and anonymous’ network. 
6 This proposition has some similarities with the work of Sum and Jessop 
(2013; see also this volume). However, whereas they bui ld on a critical-realist 
ontology and epistemology, this chapter maintains a subjective-constructivist 
stance that is grounded in Hegelian phenomenology and dialectics. For an 
entry point on this philosophical position and its significance within historical-
materialist studies, see Fraser (1997) and Knafo (2002).  
7  Warren Buffett (2003) once defined derivatives as ‘financial weapons of 
mass destruction’. In contrast, this study highlights their potentials for 
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deceiving and concealing accounting rules.   
8 This work deals specifically with FIAT. Two other important examples of 
derivatives excesses in Italy are: (1) the Italian government’s use of 
derivatives markets to comply with the Maastricht criteria; (2) local authorities’ 
adoption of interest rate swaps to circumvent the European Stability and 
Growth Pact. For a full analysis of these other two case studies, see Piga 
(2001), Dunbar (2000) and Lagna (2013). 
9 About these reforms, cf. respectively ministerial decree 27 April 1990 at 
http://www.dt.tesoro.it/export/sites/sitodt/modules/documenti_it/prevenzione_r
eati_finanziari/normativa/DM-27-apri le-1990.pdf; law no. 218, 30 July 1990, 
available at: http://www.normattiva.it; law no. 82, 7 February 1992, available 
at: http://www.normattiva.it (all retrieved 22 June 2014). 
10 About these reforms, cf. respectively ministerial decree 27 April 1990 at 
http://www.dt.tesoro.it/export/sites/sitodt/modules/documenti_it/prevenzione_r
eati_finanziari/normativa/DM-27-apri le-1990.pdf; law no. 218, 30 July 1990, 
available at: http://www.normattiva.it; law no. 82, 7 February 1992, available 
at: http://www.normattiva.it (all retrieved 22 June, 2014). 
11 Cf. law no. 474, 30 July 1994, at http://www.normattiva.it (retrieved 22 June 
2014). 
12 Cf. law no. 52, 6 February 1996. At: http://www.normattiva.it/ (retrieved 22 
June, 2014). 
13 Cf. ibid., capitolo II, art. 21, 4. Available at: http://www.normattiva.it/. The 
Capital Adequacy Directive (Directive 93/6/EEC, 15 March 1993) and the 
Investment Service Directive (Directive 93/22/EEC 10 May 1993) were 
imported into Italian law through the law decree no. 415, 23 July 1996. At: 
http://www.normattiva.it/ (all retrieved 22 June 2014). 
14  Cf. law decree no. 58, 24 February 1998. At: http://www.normattiva.it/ 
(retrieved 22 June 2014). 
15 Unless otherwise referenced, the following summary of the ‘Draghi’ reform 
is based on Enriques (2009:9–11). 
16  It is important to note that when the ‘Draghi’ reform was enacted, 
shareholder value had become a major objective also in Europe. About the 
market-oriented transformation of European corporate control, see van 
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Appeldoorn and Horn (2007). This dimension was embedded in the wider 
process of European financial market integration (Bieling 2003; Mügge 2008). 
17 For histories of the Agnelli family and FIAT’s crucial role in Italian capitalism, 
see Clark (2011) and Castronovo (2005). 
18 Unless otherwise referenced, my analysis of the FIAT-equity swap events is 
based on de Nova et al. (2010: 9–11). This is the transcript of a debate with 
Italian experts on derivatives, including Giovanni Portioli from the Insider 
Trading Department of CONSOB. 
19 Exor Group merged with Ifil and IFI in February 2009, forming Exor S.p.A. 
Today, Exor is the key investment holding that controls FIAT S.p.A. and FIAT 
Industrial. See: http://www.exor.com/ (retrieved 22 June 2014). 
20 Cf. law decree no. 58, 24 February 1998, articles 102-112. At: 
http://www.normattiva.it/ (retrieved 22 June 2014). 
21 As explained in de Nova (2010: 9–10), each participant in an equity swap is 
subject to a credit risk exposure to the counterpart. If the underlying share 
rises in price, the equity payer must make a payment in relation to the 
increase. Conversely, if the underlying share falls, the equity payer is entitled 
to a payment. Regarding these secondary equity swaps with ING and Cater 
Allen, Merrill Lynch was the equity swap receiver rather than the payer, as 
occurred with the principal swap with Exor Group. Thus, when the stock price 
fell, there was credit risk to the equity payer (ING and Cater Allen) and vice 
versa. Hence, both ING and Cater Allen mitigated such credit risk by asking 
the underlying shares as collateral in line with their price movements. For this 
reason, Merrill Lynch regularly lodged FIAT shares with ING and Cater Allen. 
22 Cf. law decree no. 58, 24 February 1998, articles 114 (par. 7) and 187-ter. 
At: http://www.normattiva.it/ (retrieved 22 June 2014). 
23 Cf. regulation no. 17919, 9 September 2011; at: 
http://www.consob.it/main/aree/novita/consultazione_emittenti_20110909_esiti
.htm (retrieved 22 June 2014). 
 
 
References 
 
 24 
Aitken, R. 2007. Performing Capital: Toward a Cultural Economy of Popular 
and Global Finance. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Amatori, F., and A. Colli. 2000. Corporate Governance: The Italian Story. 
Fontainebleau: European Institute of Business Administration 
(INSEAD). 
Amoore, L. et al. 2000. “Paths to a Historicized International Political 
Economy.” Review of International Political Economy 7(1):53–71. 
Arrow, K., and G. Debreu. 1954. “Existence of an Equilibrium for a 
Competitive Economy.” Econometrica 22(3):265–90. 
Associazione Disiano-Preite, ed. 1997. Rapporto Sulla Società Aperta. Cento 
Tesi per La Riforma Del Governo Societario in Italia. Bologna: Il 
Mulino. 
Austin, J. L. 1962. How to Do Things with Words. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Barca, F. 2001. “Compromesso Senza Riforme Nel Capitalismo Italiano.” in 
Storia del Capitalismo Italiano, edited by F. Barca. Roma: Donzelli. 
Battilossi, S. 1991. “L’Eredità Della Banca Mista. Sistema Creditizio, 
Finanziamento Industriale E Ruolo Strategico Di Mediobanca 1946-
1956.” Italia Contemporanea (185):627–53. 
Berle, A. A., and G. C. Means. 1968. The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property. San Diego: Harcourt. 
Betts, P. 1997. “The Bourse. Market `Half the Size It Should Be’.” Financial 
Times, December 10. 
Betts, P., and J. Blitz. 1997. “At the Head of Italy’s Table The FT Interview: 
Massimo D’Alema.” Financial Times, December 22. 
Beunza, D., and D. Stark. 2012. “From Dissonance to Resonance: Cognitive 
Interdependence in Quantitative Finance.” Economy and Society 
41(3):383–417. 
Bianchi, P. 1987. “The IRI in Italy: Strategic Role and Political Constraints.” 
West European Politics 10(2):269–90. 
Bieling, H. J. 2003. “Social Forces in the Making of the New European 
Economy: The Case of Financial Market Integration.” New Political 
Economy 8(2):203–24. 
Boffano, E., and P. Griseri. 2010. “Processo Ifil-Exor, Tutti Assolti ‘Non C’è 
Stato Aggiotaggio.’” La Repubblica, December 21. Retrieved 22 June 
2014 (http://torino.repubblica.it/cronaca/2010/12/21/news/efil-
exor_tutti_assolti-10442945/). 
 25 
BorsaItaliana. 1999. Fatti E Cifre Della Borsa Italiana, 1998. Retrieved 22 
June 2014 
(http://www.borsaitaliana.it/borsaitaliana/statistiche/tuttelestatistiche/fatt
iecifre/fattiecifre1998.htm). 
Boyer, R. 2000. “Is a Finance-Led Growth Regime a Viable Alternative to 
Fordism? A Preliminary Analysis.” Economy and Society 29(1):111–45. 
Bragantini, S. 2005. “Se l’Equity Swap Dribbla La Comunicazione.” 
LaVoce.info, September 25. Retrieved 22 June 2014 
(http://archivio.lavoce.info/articoli/pagina1756.html). 
Bryan, D., and M. Rafferty. 2006. Capitalism with Derivatives. A Political 
Economy of Financial Derivatives, Capital and Class. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Buffett, W. E. 2003. “Chairman’s Letter.” Berkshire Hathaway Annual Report 
2002. Retrieved 22 June 2014 
(http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2002ar/2002ar.pdf). 
Butler, J. 1997. Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative. New York: 
Routledge. 
Callon, M., ed. 1998. The Laws of the Markets. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Castronovo, V. 2005. FIAT: Una Storia del Capitalismo Italiano. Milano: 
Rizzoli. 
Cioffi, J. W., and M. Hopner. 2006. “The Political Paradox of Finance 
Capitalism: Interests, Preferences, and Center-Left Party Politics in 
Corporate Governance Reform.” Politics and Society 34(4):463–502. 
Clark, J. 2011. Mondo Agnelli: Fiat, Chrysler, and the Power of a Dynasty. 
Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons. 
Clarke, T. 2007. International Corporate Governance. A Comparative 
Approach. London, New York: Routledge. 
Deeg, R. 2005. “Remaking Italian Capitalism? The Politics of Corporate 
Governance Reform.” West European Politics 28(3):521–48. 
De Nova, G., Fusco, E., Girino, E., Onado, M., Portale, G. B., Portioli, G., 
Righi, S., Rimini, E. 2010. “Quale Futuro per I Derivati Finanziari?” 
Transcription of the Debate on “I Contratti Derivati” by Girino, E., Borsa 
Italiana S.p.A., November 11. Retrieved 22 June 2014 
(http://www.ghidini-
associati.it/Quale%20futuro%20per%20i%20derivati%20finanziari%20-
%20Trascrizione%20Dibattito.pdf). 
Dunbar, N. 2000. Inventing Money: The Story of Long-Term Capital 
Management and the Legends behind It. New York: Wiley. 
 26 
Dunbar, N. 2006. “Risky Finance: Weapons of Mass Deception.” 
www.nickdunbar.net. Retrieved 22 June 2014 
(http://www.nickdunbar.net/articles-and-reviews/risky-finance-weapons-
of-mass-deception/). 
Dyson, K., and K. Featherstone. 1996. “Italy and EMU as a ‘Vincolo Esterno’: 
Empowering the Technocrats, Transforming the State.” South 
European Society and Politics 1(2):272–99. 
Economist, The. 2005. “Still In the Driving Seat.” The Economist, October 13. 
Retrieved 22 June 2014 (http://www.economist.com/node/5026856). 
Economist, The. 2010. “Ties That Bind Mediobanca’s Grip on Generali Shows 
the Effects of Cross-Shareholdings.” The Economist, March 18. 
Retrieved 22 June 2014 (http://www.economist.com/node/15731244). 
Enriques, L. 2009. Modernizing Italy’s Corporate Governance Institutions: 
Mission Accomplished? Brussels: European Corporate Governance 
Institute (ECGI). 
Epstein, G. A. 2005. “Introduction: Financialization and the World Economy.” 
in Financialization and the World Economy, edited by G. A. Epstein. 
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Pub. 
Foucault, M. 1977. Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison. New York: 
Vintage Books. 
Fraser, I. 1997. “Two of a Kind: Hegel, Marx, Dialectic and Form.” Capital & 
Class 21(1):81–106. 
Galbraith, J. K. 2007. The New Industrial State. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Geisst, C. R. 2002. Wheels of Fortune. The History of Speculation from 
Scandal to Respectability. Hoboken: Wiley. 
Giavazzi, F., and L. Spaventa, eds. 1988. High Public Debt: The Italian 
Experience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ginsborg, P. 2001. Italy and Its Discontents, 1980-2001. London: Penguin 
Books. 
De Goede, M. 2005. Virtue, Fortune, and Faith. A Genealogy of Finance. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Goldstein, A. 2003. Privatization in Italy 1993-2002: Goals, Institutions, 
Outcomes, and Outstanding Issues. Munich: CESifo Group. 
Goodwyn, L. 1976. Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 27 
Gowan, P. 1999. The Global Gamble: Washington’s Faustian Bid for World 
Dominance. London: Verso. 
Graziani, A. 1998. Lo Sviluppo dell’Economia Italiana. Dalla Ricostruzione 
Alla Moneta Europea. Torino: Bollati Boringhieri. 
Greenspan, A. 2002. “International Financial Risk Management.” The Federal 
Reserve Board. Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan before the 
Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C. Retrieved 22 June 
2014 
(http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2002/20021119). 
Grossman, S. J., and O. D. Hart. 1988. “One Share-One Vote and the Market 
for Corporate Control.” Journal of Financial Economics 20:175–202. 
Harvey, D. 2005. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. “Theory of the Firm, Managerial 
Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.” Journal of 
Financial Economics 3(4):305–60. 
Knafo, S. 2002. “The Fetishizing Subject in Marx’s Capital.” Capital and Class 
76:145–75. 
Knafo, S. 2010. “Critical Approaches and the Legacy of the Agent/Structure 
Debate in International Relations.” Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs 23(3):493–516. 
Knafo, S. 2013. The Making of Modern Finance. Liberal Governance and the 
Gold Standard. Abingdon: Routledge. 
Konings, M. 2006. “The Rise of American Finance. Agency, Institutions and 
Structural Power from Colonial Times to the Globalization Era.” York 
University, Toronto, PhD Thesis, NR29503. 
Konings, M. 2008. “The Institutional Foundations of US Structural Power in 
International Finance: From the Re-Emergence of Global Finance to 
the Monetarist Turn.” Review of International Political Economy 
15(1):35–61. 
Konings, M. 2010a. “Neoliberalism and the American State.” Critical Sociology 
36(5):741–65. 
Konings, M. 2010b. “The Pragmatic Sources of Modern Power.” European 
Journal of Sociology 51(1):55–91. 
Konings, M. 2011. The Development of American Finance. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 28 
Lagna, A. 2013. “Deriving a Normal Country. Italian Capitalism and the 
Political Economy of Financial Derivatives.” PhD Thesis, Brighton: 
University of Sussex. 
Langley, P. 2009. The Everyday Life of Global Finance: Saving and Borrowing 
in Anglo-America. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lapavitsas, C. 2009. “Financialised Capitalism: Crisis and Financial 
Expropriation.” Historical Materialism 17:114–48. 
Lazonick, W., and M. O’Sullivan. 2000. “Maximizing Shareholder Value: A 
New Ideology for Corporate Governance.” Economy and Society 
29(1):13–35. 
Levy, J. I. 2006. “Contemplating Delivery: Futures Trading and the Problem of 
Commodity Exchange in the.” The American Historical Review 
111(2):307–35. 
Lonardi, G. 1997. “La Camera Frena Il Tesoro Sulla Riforma Delle Società.” 
La Repubblica, October 24. Retrieved 22 June 2014 
(http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1997/10/24/la
-camera-frena-il-tesoro-sulla-riforma.html). 
MacKenzie, D. 2006. An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape 
Markets. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
MacKenzie, D., and Y. Millo. 2003. “Constructing a Market, Performing 
Theory: The Historical Sociology of a Financial Derivatives Exchange.” 
The American Journal of Sociology 109(1):107–45. 
Marchetti, P. 2001. “Diritto Societario E Disciplina Della Concorrenza.” in 
Storia del Capitalismo Italiano, edited by F. Barca. Roma: Donzelli. 
Markham, J. W. 2002. A Financial History of the United States. From the Age 
of Derivatives into the New Millennium (1970-2001). Armonk: M. E. 
Sharpe. 
McCann, D. 2000. “The ‘Anglo-American’ Model, Privatization and the 
Transformation of Private Capitalism in Italy.” Modern Italy 5(1):47–61. 
Melis, A. 2000. “Corporate Governance in Italy.” Corporate Governance 
8(4):347–55. 
Mügge, D. K. 2008. “Widen the Market, Narrow the Competition: The 
Emergence of Supranational Governance in EU Capital Markets.” 
University of Amsterdam, Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences. 
Nölke, A., M. Heires, and H. J. Bieling. 2013. “Editorial: The Politics of 
Financialization.” Competition & Change 17(3):209–18. 
Norris, F. 2013. “Wielding Derivatives as a Tool for Deceit.” The New York 
Times, June 27. Retrieved 22 June 2014 
 29 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/28/business/deception-by-
derivative.html). 
Panitch, L., and S. Gindin. 2008. “Finance and American Empire.” Pp. 17–47 
in American Empire and the Political Economy of Global Finance, 
edited by L. Panitch and M. Konings. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Partnoy, F. 2009. Infectious Greed. How Deceit and Risk Corrupted Financial 
Markets. New York: PublicAffairs. 
Pasquino, G. 1995. “Partitocrazia.” in La Politica Italiana. Dizionario critico 
1945-95, edited by G. Pasquino. Roma/Bari: Laterza. 
Pasquino, G. 2000. “Political Development.” in Italy since 1945, edited by P. 
McCarthy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Penati, A. 2005. “I Furbetti Del Lingotto E Il Dodo Di Piazza Affari.” La 
Repubblica, September 23. Retrieved 22 June 2014 
(http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2005/09/23/fu
rbetti-del-lingotto-il-dodo-di.html). 
Piga, G. 2001. Derivatives and Public Debt Management. Zurich, New York: 
International Securities Market Association - Council for Foreign 
Relations. 
Preda, A. 2009. Framing Finance. The Boundaries of Markets and Modern 
Capitalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Puledda, V. 1998a. “Da Confindustria E Assonime No Alla Nuova Opa Di 
Draghi.” La Repubblica, January 28. Retrieved 22 June 2014 
(http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1998/01/28/d
a-confindustria-assonime-no-alla-nuova-opa.html). 
Puledda, V. 1998b. “Rivoluzione in Borsa Piccoli Soci Più Protetti.” La 
Repubblica, February 21. Retrieved 22 June 2014 
(http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1998/02/21/ri
voluzione-in-borsa-piccoli-soci-piu-protetti.html). 
Quaglia, L. 2011. “‘The Ebb and Flow’ of Euroscepticism in Italy.” South 
European Society and Politics 16(1):31–50. 
Rampini, F. 1997. “Il Popolo Telecom.” La Repubblica, October 29. Retrieved 
22 June 2014 
(http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1997/10/29/i l-
popolo-telecom.html). 
Repubblica, La. 1998. “Opa, La Soglia Non Scenderà Sotto Il 30% - La 
Repubblica.it.” La Repubblica, November 2. Retrieved 22 June 2014 
(http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1998/02/11/o
pa-la-soglia-non-scendera-sotto-il.html). 
 30 
Repubblica, La. 2007. “Consob, Condanne E Multe a Ifil per L’‘Equity Swap’ 
Sulla Fiat.” La Repubblica, February 13. Retrieved 22 June 2014 
(http://www.repubblica.it/2006/09/sezioni/economia/fiat-8/consob-
ifil/consob-ifil.html). 
Repubblica, La. 2013. “Ifil-Exor, Condannati Gabetti E Grande Stevens In 
Appello Un Unno E Quattro Mesi.” La Repubblica, February 21. 
Retrieved 22 June 2014 
(http://www.repubblica.it/economia/2013/02/21/news/ifil-
exor_attesa_la_sentenza_da_torino_gabetti_no_a_onta_di_una_conda
nna-53089707/). 
Roe, M. J. 1994. Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of 
American Corporate Finance. Princeton NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
Sbragia, A. 2001. “Italy Pays for Europe: Political Leadership, Political Choice, 
and Institutional Adaptation.” in Transforming Europe. Europeanization 
and Domestic Change, edited by M. Green Cowles, J. Caporaso, and 
T. Risse. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Scalfari, E. 1997. “Gli Incesti Del Capitale.” La Repubblica.it, August 29. 
Retrieved 22 June 2014 
(http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1997/08/29/gli
-incesti-del-capitale.html). 
Scalfari, E. 1998. “Grandi Famiglie E Mercato Globale.” La Repubblica. 
Retrieved 22 June 2014 
(http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1998/02/08/gr
andi-famiglie-mercato-globale.html). 
Scognamiglio, C. 1990. Rapporto Al Ministro Del Tesoro. Commissione per Il 
Riassetto Del Patrimonio Mobiliare Pubblico E per Le Privatizzazioni. 
Roma: Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato. 
Segreto, L. 1997. “Models of Control in Italian Capitalism from the Mixed Bank 
to Mediobanca, 1894-1993.” Business and Economic History 
26(2):649–61. 
Segreto, L. 1998. “Italian Capitalism between the Private and Public Sectors, 
1933-1993.” Business and Economic History 27(2):455–68. 
Segreto, L. 2008. “Il Caso Mediobanca.” in Storia d’Italia. La Banca, Annali 
23, edited by C. Bermond, A. Cova, M. Moioli, and S. La Francesca. 
Torino: Einaudi. 
Silva, P. 2008. In the Name of Reason. Technocrats and Politics in Chile. 
University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 
Stockhammer, E. 2008. “Some Stylized Facts on the Finance-Dominated 
Accumulation Regime.” Competition and Change 12(2):184–202. 
 31 
Sum, Ngai-Ling, and Bob Jessop. 2013. Towards a Cultural Political 
Economy: Putting Culture in Its Place in Political Economy. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Swan, E. J. 1999. Building the Global Market, a 4000 Year History of 
Derivatives. London: Kluwer Law International. 
Van Appeldoorn, B., and L. Horn. 2007. “The Marketisation of European 
Corporate Control: A Critical Political Economy Perspective.” New 
Political Economy 12(2):211–35. 
Wigan, D. 2008. “A Global Political Economy of Derivatives: Risk, Property 
and the Artifice of Indifference.” Dphil thesis, University of Sussex. 
Wigan, D. 2009. “Financialisation and Derivatives: Constructing an Artifice of 
Indifference.” Competition & Change 13(2):157–72. 
Zaloom, C. 2006. Out of the Pits. Traders and Technology from Chicago to 
London. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
